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Looking for Cover: A Public Choice Critique of
the Canadian Debit Card Code
MUHAREM KIANIEFF*
This paper compares and contrasts American
and Canadian efforts to regulate debit cards.
The paper begins by outlining significant dif-
ferences between the two approaches arguing
that Canadians do not enjoy the same level of
protection as do their American counterparts
with respect to its provisions governing unau-
thorized transactions, dispute resolution and
its enforcement mechanisms.
The question is then asked as to why this is the
case and the paper examines the two legal
regimes through an institutions affirming pub-
lic choice lens. The paper suggests that the
more concentrated nature of the financial serv-
ices industry in addition to its desire to fore-
stall more onerous future legislation explains
why Debit Cards in Canada are governed by a
more lax consumer protection regime than is
the case in the United States.
With respect to the methodology used to reach
this conclusion, the author postulates that pub-
lic choice can only be effective as a public pol-
icy tool if it is used in a positive prescriptive
manner that is designed to provide an institu-
tional alternative. The paper concludes with
some suggestions for reform designed to make
the legal regime in Canada more responsive to
consumer concerns.
Cet article compare et contraste les efforts
amricains et canadiens en mati~re de la r~gle-
mentation des cartes de credit. I1 souligne
d'abord les differences importantes dans ces
approches respectives, argumentant que les
Canadiennes et les Canadiens ne jouissent pas
du mme de degr6 de protection que leurs
homologues am~ricains sur le plan des disposi-
tions r~gissant les transactions non autoris~es,
le r~glement de diffrends et les mesures
d'exdcution.
Cherchant a dterminer pourquoi il en est
ainsi, l'article passe en revue les deux r~gimes
juridiques sous la lentille d'une institution con-
firmant le choix du public. L'article suggre
que le caractre plus concentr6 de lindustrie
des services financiers et son d6sir de barrer le
chemin i des mesures l~gislatives plus
rigoureuses dans ravenir expliquent pourquoi
les cartes de credit au Canada font l'objet d'un
r~gime de protection des consommatrices et
consommateurs plus liche que ce n'est le cas
aux ttats-Unis.
En ce qui concerne la m~thodologie utiis~e
pour arriver i cette conclusion, l'auteur sug-
gre que le choix du public ne peut ftre effs-
cace en tant qu'instrument de politique
publique que si on l'utilise comme une norme
positive am de fournir une alternative institu-
tionnelle. En conclusion, l'article propose cer-
taines r~formes aim d'amdiorer le regime
juridique au Canada de faqon i r~pondre aux
preoccupations des consommatrices et des
consommateurs.
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Looking for Cover: A Public Choice Critique of
the Canadian Debit Card Code
MUHAREM KIANIEFF
In 1992, the government of Canada began to negotiate and implement a vol-
untary code that would govern rights and liabilities pertaining to consumer debit
card purchases. These efforts culminated in the Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer
Debit Card Services,' which was subsequently revised in 1996, 2002 and 2004. The
Debit Code arrived with very little fanfare and scant media attention with respect to
the processes used to generate its substantive provisions.2 On a comparative level,
despite the fact that the Debit Code was enacted much sooner than its American coun-
terpart, the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 3 the Debit Code is less comprehensive and
favourable to consumer interests. This is particularly the case with respect to its pro-
visions governing unauthorized transactions and its dispute resolution and enforce-
ment mechanisms. The question, then, is why are American regulations much more
stringent in these regards?
Public choice theory postulates that legislative and regulatory decisions are a
product of the intersection of complex and competing interests of different groups
in society. This theory can help explain why it is that a voluntary code governing
rights and liabilities in the area of consumer debit card purchases was adopted in
Canada rather than a legislative scheme. One could hypothesize that the Debit Code
was used as a proactive measure by the financial services industry to avoid govern-
mental regulation in the future. Events in the past have shown that banking issues that
directly impact consumers have been attractive political targets for regulation. By
relying upon a voluntary code approach, the industry would have more control over
the substantive content of the Debit Code and consequently be in a better position to
shift the burden of losses onto consumers. The process was one that was particularly
favourable for the industry to assert its expertise in economic affairs at the expense
of consumer interests due to the relative weakness of the consumer movement vis-a-
vis the financial services lobby.
Public choice as a paradigm is not monolithic and has been used to justify a
broad variety of political and legal positions. One of the strengths of this mode of
analysis is that it is helpful in allowing one to identify weaknesses in the legislative or
1. Electronic Funds Transfer Worldng Group, Canadian Code of Practicefor Consumer Debit Card Services, online:
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
<http: //www.fcac.gc.ca/eng/compliance/DebitCardCode/DebitCardCode-e.pdf> [Debit Code].
2. Indeed a search of national newspapers reveals that the issue did not receive widespread attention in the
media. The Globe and Mail saw fit to devote only a quarter of a column to the issue. See "Card Code
Introduced" The Globe and Mail (2 May 1992) B2.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994) [EFTA].
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regulatory process and in the legislation, rules and decisions issued by public institu-
tions. It is argued, however, that the public choice approach is useful only when it is
used in a comparative "institutions affirming" manner that seeks to design institutions
that can withstand the public choice problem. In other words, it can meet its true
potential if it is used as a tool to diagnose and then offer solutions to correct defi-
ciencies in legislation or institutions as opposed to merely acting as a descriptive tool
that undermines institutions without offering an alternative.
Broadly speaking, this paper will present a case study that seeks to illustrate
how public choice can be used in a positive manner in order to argue for a more equi-
table rights allocation mechanism for consumers. This case study may prove to be a
useful means of identifying deficiencies both within the Debit Code and within public
choice theory itself. Admittedly, this is no small task indeed, and it is a rather ambi-
tious task to be completed within the confines of this paper. Yet, one remains hope-
ful that the brief overview offered in this piece will acquaint those unfamiliar with the
Debit Code, with its contents and theory, and outline some points of contention with
a view to stimulating debate on the issues raised here. Section I of this paper will
briefly outline the Debit Code and some of its deficiencies. Section II will outline some
of the basic premises of public choice and interest group theories. Section III will
examine the Debit Code through a public choice perspective and illustrate how private
interests have found it advantageous to use law as a means of shifting risks onto con-
sumers and as a means of averting onerous future legislation. The paper will conclude
in section IV with some reflections on the methodology used in section III and an
assessment of its utility as a form of analysis.
I. THE DEBIT CODE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
A. American Efforts to Regulate Debit Cards
The development of the Debit Code did not take place in an isolated manner.
International attempts and precedents played a large part in determining the
Canadian course of action. As was previously stated, the Debit Code was promulgated
in 1992. However, its American equivalent, the EFTA, 4 was enacted in 1978. A com-
parison of the substantive components of Regulation E and the Debit Code is necessary
in order to comprehend the actions of regulatory authorities both in the United
States and in Canada.
But first, a little history. Regulation E is the logical extension of consumer
protection laws that were first enacted with respect to credit cards eight years earli-
er. The credit card consumer protection provisions came in the form of amendments
4. Ibid., as implemented through Regulation E by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 12
C.F.R. § 205 (1996) [Regulation El.
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to the Consumer Credit Protection Act,' which is also implemented by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System through Regulation Z.6 This regulation was
largely developed in response to regulators' concerns regarding early credit card
marketing techniques used by banks in the 1960s and 70s. 7 When the precursors to
today's major credit cards began operations in the late 1950s, many were confronted
with the problem of obtaining a critical mass for their products. One way in which
merchants were convinced of the virtues of accepting credit cards came in the rep-
resentations made by banks and issuers that large numbers of individuals in a partic-
ular geographic area had access to a credit card.'
Credit card issuers still had to find a way of combating the converse problem
of convincing consumers to accept and use a system of revolving credit, which, at
that time, seemed like a foreign concept to the masses. During the late 1950s, indi-
viduals were much more credit averse than they are at the present time, in large part
because many of them still had vivid memories of the pay-as-you-go era during the
Great Depression.9 The solution, as envisioned by the issuers, was to distribute cards
by mass mailings and rely on the good faith of individuals who would decide whether
to keep the card or simply to discard it. Unfortunately for the issuers, a credit mech-
anism that essentially allowed individuals to act as their own loan officer ran con-
trary to 1950s paternalistic views of credit as shaped by the Depression. 0 Those in
public positions of authority seized the opportunity and denounced the credit card
as a product that was "morally and financially ruinous to the public welfare.""
Moreover, concerns arose over the onerous terms found in cardholder agreements
that stated that holders of cards would be liable for their use even if their cards were
lost or stolen. 12
The precursor to what would eventually become the MasterCard credit card
system had a very difficult time convincing consumers to adopt it due to negative
publicity that followed its debut. Following their initial distribution in the Chicago
market in the early 1960s, consumers in that area began hearing media reports that
heightened their aversion to credit cards. One such report appeared when a van filled
with new cards overturned and spilled the cards in every direction: "the newspapers
had pictures the next day of people grabbing credit cards by the handful, presumably
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1642-43 (1988).
6. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1997) [Regulation Z1.
7. Jane Kaufman Winn, "Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce" (1998) 72 Tul.
L. Rev. 1177 at 1232 [Winn,"Open Systems].
8. Joseph Nocera, A Piece of the Action: How the Middle Class Joined the Money Class (NewYork: Simon and
Schuster, 1994) at 26.
9. Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig & Lynn Bruneau, 21st Century Money, Banking and Commerce
(Washington: Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, 1998) at 56.
10. Nocera, supra note 8 at 26.
I1. Ibid. at 31.
12. Ibid.
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for later use." 3 Stories also appeared in which Chicago postal clerks were stealing
unmailed credit cards to be sold on the black market. 14 As Joseph Nocera notes, legit-
imate consumers "had to worry not only about all the unwanted cards that had
arrived, but about all the unwanted cards that hadn't arrived." Similar experiences
were found in the Los Angeles area in the late 195 Os, as the precursor of what is today
Visa faced similar difficulties. Stories such as these became all too common and pro-
voked significant public outcries over the terms found in cardholder agreements.16
Inevitably, credit card marketing became a political issue. The United States
Congress held its first hearings on credit cards in November 1967.17 The paternalis-
tic view of credit control was present in those hearings as witnesses warned of the
potential for credit cards to encourage a dependency on debt. Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin was quoted as saying: "Unless we bring unsolicited credit
cards under control, we are likely to produce a nation of credit drunks."'i When con-
fronted with claims that bank mailings had gone awry and that the resulting problems
created anxiety among consumers, banking industry lobbyists refused to acknowl-
edge the problems. '9 Faced with the prospect that the banking sector was unwilling
or unable to rectify the situation for consumers, Congress decided to act. When
Senator Proxmire introduced a bill that would ban unsolicited credit card mailings,
the Senate voted in favour by a margin of 79-1. 2o
Despite industry opposition to governmental intervention, the general con-
sensus has been that regulation has been an effective means of preventing consumer
injustices. This has also been the case in the common law interpretation of Regulation
Z, which judges have tended to interpret in favour of consumers.2' As Jane Kaufman
Winn states, credit cards are the consumer choice of payment device on the Internet,
largely as a result of the consumer protection features that were mandated thirty
years ago.22 In another work, Professor Winn argues that Regulation Z has had addi-
tional benefits. By placing more of the burden of unauthorized transactions on card
issuers, merchants and merchant banks, additional resources have been invested in
order to make the system more safe and secure.
23
13. Ibid. at 59.
14. Ibid. at 58.
15. Ibid [emphasis in original].
16. Some of these incidents are outlined in Nocera, ibid. at 57-62.
17. Nocera, ibid. at 60.
18. ibid.
19. Ibid. at61.
20. bid.
21. See Martin v. American Express Inc., 361 So.2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978), citing Irvin v. Public Finance Company
ofAlabama, 340 So.2d 811 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976), which stated that Regulation Z was to be liberally con-
strued in favour of the consumer and its terms strictly enforced against credit card issuers.
22. U.S., The Future of Electronic Payments: Roadblocks and Emerging Practices: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Domestic and International Monetary Policy of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong.
(2000) (Jane K. Winn), online: House Committee on Banking and Financial Services
<http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/91900win.htm>.
23. Winn, "Open Systems", supra note 7 at 1235.
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The regulations that followed placed restrictions on the unsolicited mailing of
credit cards and set liability limits for unauthorized transactions at $50 for con-
sumers.2 4 These regulations guaranteed fairness in the provision of credit and helped
protect consumer privacy as well.2" While many industry participants had initially
opposed regulation as a means of increasing transaction costs for consumers in the
form of higher interest rates in order to pay for the costs of compliance, regulation
has since been seen as something favourable for the industry. Regulation is viewed as
a stabilizing force that has also increased consumer acceptance and helped generate a
critical mass for credit cards.26
As technology progressed in the 1970s and the myth of debit card technology
was becoming a reality, many consumer groups realized that existing consumer pro-
tection laws were inadequate to safeguard against many of the same abuses that had
plagued credit cards in previous years. Congress established the National
Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers in 1974, giving it a mandate to recom-
mend appropriate administrative and legislative action if necessary.27 Despite the fact
that this Commission was comprised mainly of bankers and bank regulators, it rec-
ommended that many consumer protection issues be addressed in order to safeguard
consumer rights.28 Consumer groups were successful in their efforts to obtain feder-
al legislation despite the protests of some industry participants who argued (much the
same way that they do today regarding smart cards) that legislation was premature
and would end up fatally wounding an infant industry. 29
At the time, the EFTA was seen as a good starting point by some for provid-
ing minimal consumer protection as a means of addressing market failures.30 The
salience of the political issue at the time made debit card regulation a subject that
garnered widespread support in the media. 31 Politicians were quick to capitalize on
the opportunity to pass electorally favourable legislation that was pro-consumer for
the most part.
24. Regulation Z, supra note 6 § 226.12(b).
25. Lewis Mandell, The Credit Card Industry:A History (Boston: Twayne, 1990) at 52-61.
26. Jane Kaufman Winn, "Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition between Established and Emerging
Electronic Payment Systems" (1999) 14 BerkeleyTech. L.J. 675, online: <http://www.law.berkeleyedu/
journals/bij /articles/vol 14/Winn/html/reader.html> [Winn, "Clash of the Titans].
27. Lewis M. Taffer, "The Making of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act: A Look at Consumer Liability and Error
Resolution" (1979) 13 U.S. F.L. Rev. 231 at 232. See also David C. Hsia, "Legislative History and Proposed
Regulatory Implementation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act" (1979) 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 299.
28. Taffer, supra note 27 at 232-33.
29. Ibid.
30. See for example Ellen Broadman, "Electronic Fund Transfer Act: Is the Consumer Protected?" (1979) 13
U.S.F.L. Rev. 245. But see Mark E. Budnitz, "The Impact of EFT Upon Consumers: Practical Problems
Faced by Consumers" (1979) 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 361.
31. See Taffer, supra note 27 at n. 12, citing media reports that raised public awareness.
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Regulation E has six major substantive elements:
1. It restricts the issuance of unsolicited account access devices.
2. It requires certain initial disclosures of the terms and conditions of the electronic fund
transfer service.
3. It requires notice of certain changes in the terms and conditions initially disclosed.
4. It requires transaction receipts and periodic account statements.
5. It establishes error resolution procedures.
6. It imposes limits for unauthorized transfers.
With respect to unauthorized transfers, a consumer's liability is limited to $50
provided that the issuer is notified within two business days after the unauthorized
transfer is discovered. However, if the account holder waits for more than two days
before notifying the issuer, the maximum liability increases to $500. After 60 days,
the consumer is liable for the entire amount.12 Moreover, Regulation E states that an
institution that fails to follow requirements can be liable to consumers without proof
of actual damage."3 The judicial treatment of this Act has generally been quite
favourable to consumers and has been liberally construed.14
Regulation E represents a political compromise over optimal risk allocation in
the payment system. Although many have seen it as the manifestation of the success-
ful lobbying efforts of consumer advocates, it still imposes various obligations on con-
sumers.35 Many of the rules and regulations pertaining to consumer electronic
payments deal with issues of loss allocation resulting from fraudulent, negligent or
unauthorized transactions.3 6 Generally, laws that seek to attain economic efficiency
with respect to loss allocation follow the principles of efficient loss spreading,"
reduction 8 and imposition. 9
32. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1) (2005).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1693m (1992).
34. Tom S. Onyshko & Robert C. Owens, "Debit cards and stored value cards: legal regulation and privacy con-
cerns" (1997) 16 Nat'l Banking L. Rev. 65 at 67.
35. Robert Hayhoe, "Fraud, the Consumer, and the Banks:The (un-) Regulation of Electronic Funds Transfer"
(1995) 53 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 346 at 354.
36. See generally Hal S. Scott, "The Risk Fixers" (1978) 91 Harv. L. Rev. 737.
37. This principle is described as the assignment of liability for a loss on the party that can achieve risk neutrali-
ty at the least cost. The party that can achieve this is the one that has greater economic resources and is in a
position to spread the loss most effectively. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, "A Theory of Loss
Allocation for Consumer Payments" (1987) 66Tex. L. Rev. 63 at 71.
38. Ibid. at 73 [footnotes omitted]: "Loss spreading presumes that a loss already has occurred and assigns liability
to the party that can more effectively spread it, but the loss reduction principle assigns liability for the more
complex purpose of affecting human behavior. It thus raises empirical questions about the effectiveness of
liability rules, adds a dynamic element because behavior changes over time, and produces a variety of moral
concerns about the proper standards of behavior. In discussing these issues, this Article distinguishes four
distinct elements of the principle's operation: precaution, innovation, responsiveness, and learning."
39. Ibid. at 78: "The third principle in establishing an efficient payment law, the loss imposition principle, con-
cerns the enforcement of this assigned liability. The enforcement process turns the law from a set of legal
rules into a series of actual monetary transfers. Liability may be enforced through civil suits, criminal trials,
or administrative proceedings, as well as through the many informal devices for settling disputes. One fea-
ture that all these mechanisms share is that they are costly; they represent a deadweight loss to the partici-
pants in the payment system. To achieve efficiency, therefore, the enforcement process should be as
inexpensive as possible."
108
LOOKING FOR COVER: A PUBLIC CHOICE 109
CRITIQUE OF THE CANADIAN DEBIT CARD CODE
Robert Cooter and Edward Rubin argue that the $50 unauthorized transac-
tion limit in Regulation E serves as a means of encouraging "bilateral precautions" in
an economically efficient manner. "Capped consumer liability", as they refer to it,
ensures that "both consumers and fimancial institutions [are] strictly liable for their
assigned portion of the loss."This gives consumers a pecuniary incentive to exercise
care in the handling of their debit cards. At the same time, this also ensures that
financial institutions absorb all losses over the limit since "they can spread the loss-
es and develop new technology to counteract their own carelessness, as well as that
of the consumer."40
B. Canadian Efforts to Regulate Debit Cards
The adoption of Regulation E by American regulators would have worldwide
benefits. Fundamentally, the argument that the regulation of debit cards was best left
to the industry itself would not appear as persuasive since one of the world's leading
proponents of laissez-faire economics had decided that governmental regulation was
the best means of addressing the issue. Despite industry opposition, consumer advo-
cates still managed to get the attention of lawmakers, bringing increased protection
for consumers. American debit card issuers (many of whom are also credit card
issuers) in turn agreed to extend their compliance with Regulation E to their global
operations. However, domestic card issuers were under no such obligations.
Prior to 1992, consumer rights vis-a-vis debit cards were largely determined
by cardholder agreements. 4 ' As a result of the unequal bargaining power that exists
between individual consumers and large fi'mancial institutions, these agreements
tended to put a larger burden on individual cardholders with respect to unauthorized
transactions. 42 Not surprisingly, when Canadian banks were contemplating a large-
scale roll out of a retail point of sale payment system using bankcards (what would
eventually become Interac), reassurances had to be made to consumers that their
concerns were being addressed.
Industry Canada states that during this initial period when the Interac sys-
tem was being introduced, they received numerous complaints from consumer
representatives. 4 These complaints centered on transaction errors, unauthorized
use of debit cards, the handling of complaints and problem solving procedures. As
a result, in 1989, the then federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs
established the Electronic Funds Transfer Working Group, a group charged with the
40. Ibid. at 90.
41. Onyshko & Owens, supra note 34 at 74.
42. See generally Margaret Samuel, "Non-cash alternatives and money laundering: An American model for
Canadian Consumers' protection" (1992-93) 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 169.
43. Industry Canada, Electronic Funds Transfer Code: Executive Summary byYves Giroux & David Waite (1996),
online: Industry Canada Consumer Connection
<http:/ /strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inoca-bc.nsf/en/ca00786e.html>.
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task of developing a code that would apply to consumer debit card purchases. 44
With debit cards being a relatively new product in the Canadian market, and being
offered by a relatively small number of suppliers, 4 Industry Canada felt that any
sort of solution should be brought about by consensus with government, industry
and consumer groups working together from the outset. 46The Department felt that
the remedy to be devised should be one that would be relatively easy to update as
circumstances warranted .
The concept that was followed was the Debit Code, a voluntary code that is still
in use. Substantively, the Debit Code is not as precise as its American counterpart is.
As is the case with Regulation E, the Debit Code provides guidelines to be followed
pertaining to the issuing of cards, 48 providing necessary disclosures written in plain
language49 and mandating the provision of receipts and records for consumer trans-
actions.5 0 Guidelines also pertain to the assignment of liability in the event of an
unauthorized transaction,"' and outline dispute resolution procedures.12 Recent
amendments in 2002 have added new definitions that encompass debit card terminals
to be used in the home. 3 In addition, a new Appendix was added to act as an inter-
pretative guide to the section pertaining to unauthorized transactions. 4
With respect to unauthorized transactions, the Debit Code caps the cardhold-
er's losses to the established debit card transaction withdrawal limits."5 However, the
cap on liability is notably higher under the Debit Code than it is under Regulation E.
Under the Debit Code, a cardholder's potential liability is a function of the cardhold-
er's agreement,5 6 failing which standard withdrawal limits apply. The components of
the withdrawal limits are the amounts that can be withdrawn from an automated
banking machine (ABM) and the amount that a consumer can purchase with their
debit card through a point of sale terminal per day. As such, the total daily withdrawal
limit that is derived for the purposes of the Debit Code is calculated by adding the two
together. The example given in the Appendix gives the hypothetical figure of $3,000
as a threshold of this limit 57-arguably a significant difference from the $50 cap
44. Kernaghan Webb et al., Strategic Alliances for Consumer Groups, (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1996) at 20-21,
online: Industry Canada Strategis
<h ttp: / /strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inoca-bc.nsf/vwap/Strate-e.pdf/$FfLE/Strate-e.pdf>.
45. Industry Canada, supra note 43.
46. Webb supra note 44 at 20-21.
47. "Canadian Code of Practice for Consumer Debit Card Services" Canada Newswire (I May 1992).
48. Supra note 1, s. 2
49. S. 3.
50. S.4.
51. S. 5.
52. S.7.
53. S.9.
54. App. A.
55. S. 5(4).
56. App. A, cl. 4.
57. Ibid.
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imposed by Regulation E during the initial loss period. However, these amounts can
vary from individual to individual based upon the nature of their accounts. It would
not be unreasonable to conclude that Canadian consumers do not face as clear a base-
line of liability as that enjoyed by American consumers.
The Debit Code states that cardholders are not liable for any unauthorized trans-
actions where the card issuer is responsible for preventing such use, such as where:
* the card is reported lost or stolen;
* the card has been cancelled or has expired; or
* the cardholder has reported that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) may have
become known to a third party.
58
In addition, cardholders are not held liable in circumstances where they have
unintentionally contributed to an unauthorized use provided that they cooperate in
any subsequent investigation. 9 Consumers are also not liable for, among others, loss-
es arising:
* from technical failures of the payment infrastructure;
60
* from the fraudulent or negligent conduct of actors in the payment system and their agents;
61
* after the issuer has been notified of a card loss, misuse or security compromise; 62 or
* "where the cardholder has been the victim of fraud, theft, or has been coerced by
trickery, force or intimidation".
6 3
Many of these provisions are analogous to those found in Regulation E.
64
Section 6 of the Debit Code sets out a hierarchy that consumers are expected
to follow when they seek recourse for specific problems. Primary responsibility is in
the hands of the PIN issuer, who is responsible for problems pertaining to transac-
tions. 65 In the event of a dispute regarding card terminals in the home, a cardholder
is directed to contact the card acceptor who shall trace the source of the problem and
"advise the cardholder of the appropriate party to contact to resolve the problem ."66
If there is a dispute regarding goods and services, the consumer is advised to find a
remedy from the retailer. 67 Regulation E, with the exception of concerns pertaining
to retailers,68 makes no distinctions between issuers and acceptors. 69 Indeed part of
58. S. 5(3)(b).
59. S. 5(3)(c).
60. App. A, cI. 3(1)(a).
61. App. A, cl. 3(1)(b).
62. App. A, cI. 3(I)().
63. App. A, cl. 3(1)(g).
64. See 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1997); Supp. I § 205.2(m) (1997).
65. Debit Code, supra note 1,s. 6(l).
66. S. 6(2).
67. S. 6(3).
68. Although Regulation Z, which pertains to credit cards, does allow consumers to seek redress from card
issuers in the event of a dispute regarding goods and services.
69. It ought to be noted that this distinction may have arisen as the result of an order made by the competition
tribunal regarding the domination of large financial institutions in the provision of retail payment services,
an area which retailers and insurance companies had wanted to enter into. For additional information please
see Shameela Chinoy & Benjamin Geva, "Access to the Canadian Payment System" in The Regulation of
Financial Institutions: Issues and Perspectives, Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium 1996 (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carswell, 1997) at 411.
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the difficulty in placing responsibility for consumer redress in the hands of a number
of actors in the payment system, as the Debit Code does, is that the temptation for any
of them to act as a quarterback handing complaints off to other actors may exist.
With respect to dispute resolution mechanisms, the Debit Code does have some
subtle differences with Regulation E. For example, the Debit Code states that PIN
issuers will have "timely procedures" to deal with debit card transaction problems and
provide for reviews at a senior level within their organizations. 70 Regulation E, by
contrast, specifically requires that financial institutions investigate and determine
whether an error has occurred within ten business days of receiving notice of an error
in the case of domestic transactions, 71 and within twenty days with respect to trans-
actions initiated outside of the United States. 72 The Debit Code states that it does not
pertain to international transactions (stating that other arrangements exist with
respect to these transactions) although its members will endeavour to protect con-
sumers and resolve any problems that occur.73
Regulation E requires an issuer to grant provisional credit to the consumer's
account where an investigation exceeds the ten-day period.7 4 Conversely, the Debit
Code uses the vague language that cardholders not be "unreasonably restricted from
the use of funds that are the subject of the dispute."5 Unlike the Debit Code,
Regulation E mandates that even if an account has been credited provisionally, a finan-
cial institution must investigate the consumer's claim and provide a written report of
its findings. In the event that the financial institution rules against the consumer, it
must provide reasons and, upon request, copies of all documents that it relied upon
in reaching its decision.76 The Debit Code requires a PIN issuer to provide reasons to
the consumer if it cannot settle the problem.7 7 The Debit Code is silent on the need to
provide copies of the documents relied upon. In the event that an issuer acts in bad
faith or fails to credit an account when it is required to do so, Regulation E makes it
liable for treble damages. 78 There is no such requirement under the Debit Code.
Unlike Regulation E, the Debit Code contains no sanctions for those who do not
comply with its requirements. Regulation E, on the other hand, provides that those
who fail to comply with its provisions are liable for actual damage, liquidated dam-
ages of $100 to $1 000 and attorney's fees. 7 As Professor Rubin notes, the possibil-
ity of obtaining up to $1 000 without proving actual damage is a powerful incentive
70. Supra note 1, s. 6(4).
71. Supra note 4, § 205.11(c)(1) (199 7).
72. § 205.11(c)(3)(i) (1997).
73. Supra note 1,s. ](4).
74. Supra note 4, § 205.11(c)(2)(i) (1997).
75. Supra note 1, s. 7(3).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(d) (1988).
77. Supra note 1, s. 7(2).
78. IS U.S.C. § 1693f(e) (1988).
79. § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
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for consumers to enforce their rights."0 Moreover, the Debit Code does not have an
appeal mechanism available for those consumers who feel that their complaints have
not been adequately addressed."s
While these differences may seem trite at the outset, there are serious reper-
cussions for consumers. Beginning first with the question of unauthorized transac-
tions, one notices that the Debit Code, like Regulation E, does not hold consumers
responsible for unauthorized transactions that they have not contributed to through
their own negligence. Exceptions are also made for consumers who contribute to
unauthorized use unintentionally. 2 However, the Debit Code defines an incident of
consumer negligence as one where a consumer fails to notify the issuer of a loss or
breach of security "within a reasonable time." 3 Appendix A then refines the definition
of a "reasonable time" to the instant that the cardholder becomes aware of the loss of
a card or the disclosure of a PIN. 4 Should a cardholder fail to notify an issuer in time
under this section, he or she can then be conceivably liable for the $ 3 000 set out in
the example found in Appendix A and for even greater amounts if an account has
overdraft protection, is linked to a line of credit or has been subjected to the deposit
of a fraudulent cheque or empty deposit envelope."5
As a form of risk allocation, one can observe that the Debit Code places much
greater liabilities on consumers than does Regulation E. As such, the Debit Code
attempts to provide incentives for consumers to take greater precautions in order to
mitigate the threat of a loss. Yet it ought to be noted that there is relatively little data
pertaining to the effects of liability rules on consumer behaviour.8 6 As Professors
Cooter and Rubin observe:
Evidence indicating that consumers are unresponsive to liability would favor a rule of no
liability for consumers; the opposite result would favor a rule of strict, but limited, liabil-
ity. In no case, however, would economically based rules produce the unlimited con-
sumer liability that the UCC and the EFTA currently impose.8 7
80. Edward Rubin, "Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4" (1990-91) 42 Ala. L. Rev.
551 at 581 [Rubin,"Efficiency"].
81. Debit Code, supra note 1, s. 7(l): "The PIN issuer will provide information, in writing on how the dispute-
resolution process works if: a) a problem with a debit card transaction cannot be settled when the cardhold-
er first complains."
S. 7(2): "A cardholder whose problem cannot be settled by the PIN issuer will be informed of the reasons
for the issuer's position on the matter. The issuer will then advise the cardholder of the appropriate party to
contact regarding the dispute." It is interesting to note that the Debit Code does not actually define what each
stage is in the dispute resolution process that it is referring to.
82. Debit Code, supra note 1, s. S(3)(c).
83. S. 5(S)(b).
84. App. A, cl. S(8)(a).
85. App. A, cl. 4(1).
86. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 37 at 1 I 5.
87. /bid. at 116.
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One will recall that a benefit of shifting risks onto financial institutions is that
they are given a pecuniary incentive to make the necessary investments required to
improve security in the payment system and to make it more efficient.8 8 By placing
liability upon consumers, this incentive is removed to the detriment of the payment
system as a whole. Indeed, by placing the threshold at such a high level, the Debit Code
is diminishing the marginal utility that is gained by having consumers take extraordi-
nary care. In order to be effective as a precautionary measure, the threshold of liabil-
ity should be at a level that, if consumers lose money, it is an amount that matters
enough to them to take reasonable care but not one that will "cause a personal cri-
sis."8 9 Individuals who are facing losses if they act carelessly will still do so, even in the
face of additional liability, since their actions are the result of their failure to take ade-
quate care and not a conscious weighing of costs and benefits: "Beyond a certain
point, liability simply punishes the consumer without achieving any increased level of
loss reduction."90
A second concern regarding the effectiveness of the Debit Code in safeguarding
consumer interests and thereby improving the efficiency of the payment system con-
cerns the enforcement of consumer rights. Recent changes have added a new dimen-
sion to their enforcement. After years of study, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
Act91 was enacted in 2001. The act established a new federal agency, the Financial
Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC), whose mandate is to:
a. supervise financial institutions to determine whether they are in compliance with con-
sumer [protection legislation] applicable to them;
b. promote the adoption by financial institutions of policies and procedures designed to
implement [the applicable] consumer [protection legislation];
c. monitor the implementation of voluntary codes of conduct that are designed to pro-
tect the interests of customers of financial institutions and that are publicly available and
to monitor any public commitments made by financial institutions that are designed to
protect the interests of their customers;
d. promote consumer awareness [of existing laws governing their rights and responsi-
bilities]; and
e. foster.., an understanding of financial services and issues relating to financial services
[with government, government agencies, industry and consumer groups].
9 2
While this institution was not in existence at the time that the Debit Code was
promulgated, the FCAC has now undertaken to monitor compliance with the Debit
Code.93 To be sure, the FCAC does bring with it the potential that in the future, a legal
88. ]bid. at 90.
89. Rubin, "Efficiency", supra note 80 at 583.
90. Ibid. at 568.
91. S.C. 2001, c. 9 [FCACAa].
92. S. 3(2). The final paragraph would seem to confirm the suspicions of more sceptical public choice scholars.
93. R. Alan Young, "The New Watchdog In Town-Financial Consumer Agency of Canada" (2002) 21 Nat'l
Banking L. Rev. 37 at 37.
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enforcement mechanism for representations made to consumers by industry will be
in place. However, at the present time, the FCAC has stressed that its role will pri-
marily be that of a watchdog, providing consumers with facts as opposed to acting as
an advocate for them. 94
The result, then, is that enforcement of the Debit Code will primarily be gov-
erned by a complaint-driven process. Individual complaints are considered to be out-
side of the FCAC's mandate. Therefore, the FCAC will have no choice but to direct
consumers to find their remedies through the internal dispute resolution mechanisms
of the parties outlined in the Debit Code and, if necessary, through the internal
ombudspersons of the financial institutions and/or the Canadian Banking
Ombudsman. 9 In the event of a dispute, "a financial institution possesses the disput-
ed assets .... Thus, the consumer has the burden of going forward with a lawsuit."96
To quote from Professor Rubin:
This is a market failure of its own, a market failure generated by the structure of the legal
system .... What makes this particularly serious is that consumers almost always end up
with the loss if there is a dispute. The bank is holding the consumer's money, and can
simply debit the account for the amount in question. This power, virtually unique among
businesses, means that the consumer must generally initiate the lawsuit.
97
This is in contrast to a credit account, where "the consumer can withhold the
payment, which places the burden of going forward on the institution."9
In the event that the dispute resolution mechanisms mandated in the Debit
Code fail to produce a satisfactory result for a consumer, they will have to seek redress
from a court. However, as Hayhoe observes, in many cases the losses resulting from
unauthorized transactions will be small. As such, "the consumer is unlikely to be able
to retain counsel for an amount commensurate with the possible recovery", and she
or he "will have to present her [or his] own case." Such a consumer will be in the
unenviable position of facing experienced counsel representing a large financial insti-
tution or corporation." A consumer's lack of familiarity with the legal system or
process may also result in an under-enforcement of consumer rights. 100
94. Ibid. at 38.
95. Ibid.
96. Cooter & Rubin, "Loss Allocation", supra note 37 at 116.
97. Rubin, "Efficiency", supra note 80 at 569-70.
98. Cooter & Rubin, "Loss Allocation", supra note 37 at 116.
99. Hayhoe, supra note 35 at 352.
100. Cooter & Rubin, "Loss Allocation", supra note 37 at 116. Indeed, society itself may be faced with additional
externalities as a result of the fact that a commercial enterprise will be able to finance its legal operations at
the expense of the state due to the fact that the cost of litigation is tax deductible as a business expense. See
Reuben Hasson, "Unconscionability in Contract Law and in the New Sales Act-Confessions of a Doubting
Thomas" (1979-80) 4 Can. Bus. L.J. 383 at 400.
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Moreover, as Professor Rubin correctly observes, an agency charged with
the enforcement of an act can be more proactive by "initiating enforcement efforts
as a matter of governmental policy."'' This could cure the defects in both the Debit
Code and Regulation E mentioned above. This type of enforcement can be initiated
independent of the need to justify the potential return in any particular case. 0 2
Unlike private parties, enforcement agencies are "not precluded from achieving
[their objectives] by structural constraints present in the method of initiating the
enforcement process."0 3
It is clear that if we are to have a truly efficient and competitive payment sys-
tem that places an emphasis on meeting consumer needs and expectations, then sig-
nificant policy changes must take place. The question that remains to be answered is
why have laws in Canada developed in the manner that they have? One answer is juris-
dictional. The Canadian constitution makes the regulation of credit unions, caisses pop-
ulaires, finance companies, cheque cashing outlets, mutual fund dealers and securities
dealers a matter of provincial responsibility. 104 Nevertheless, this division of powers
has not hindered a federally empowered agency, the Canadian Payments Association,
from regulating these same entities with respect to the Canadian payment system on
a macro level. 105
A second answer may be that political structures and interests have played a
role in determining the course of action followed by Canadian regulators vis-6-vis
international payment laws and standards. As these developments do not normally
take place in a vacuum, card issuers knew very well that calls would be made for sim-
ilar rules in Canada as those made to protect consumers in the United States. As such,
a public choice analysis may be an ideal method of analyzing the subsequent develop-
ment of rules in Canada and of explaining why institutions and rules have taken the
shape they have.
101. Edward L. Rubin, "Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the
Payment System"(1988-89) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1251 at 1269 [Rubin, "Payment Systeml.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Young, supra note 94 at 37.
105. Canadian PaymentsAct, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-21, s.1; FCACAct, supra note 91, s. 218.
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II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND ITS SUBSTANCE
Public choice theory, broadly speaking, is a theory that has traditionally been
used to question the effectiveness of the state and its organs in articulating and imple-
menting the will of the public. The theory itself is divided into two separate claims
regarding the ability of democracy to provide good government that works in the
interests of society as a whole. For this reason, the vast majority of public choice
scholarship is quite often classified as "pessimistic," although not all strands of public
choice theory reach the same conclusion (see discussion below). The first is the
Arrow branch, which is designed to demonstrate that democratic decision-making
does not produce definitive decisions that can be taken to reflect the true will of soci-
ety. The second branch is the "interest group/capture" side, which in essence argues
that decision-making in state institutions is not always in the public interest, but
rather, is shaped by private/special interests that, more often than not, run contrary
to the public interest. I will describe the two branches in more detail below. It is
important to note, however, that both branches can be used together or independ-
ently from each other. They are both presented here for the sake of completeness in
order for the reader to form a more thorough understanding of the substance and
implications of public choice theory.
A. Arrow's Theorem and the Basic Tenets of Public Choice Theory
The rise of the administrative state brought with it a renewed interest in the
fundamental motivations governing policy makers. The ability of disinterested
bureaucrats to wield the discretionary power required of their stations raised con-
cerns surrounding the legitimacy of their decisions and their roles in the democratic
administration of government. Since the early 1940s, questions arose in political sci-
ence regarding definitions of what would objectively constitute the public good.
Politically, pluralism was seen as a means of bringing a sort of market equilibrium to
the political arena whereby groups and interests competed with each other for polit-
ical support among electors, who would determine public values as expressed
through the ballot box. Under this arrangement, "the state did not itself articulate any
fixed public values". 1°6The role of the courts and other legal institutions, in these cir-
cumstances, is limited "to ensuring that the process of legislative decision-making is
fair and open."107
The notion of power struggles determining political outcomes was certainly
nothing new in politics. From Plato to Machiavelli to Lord Acton to the present,
many authors have characterized politics as such.Yet as political demands for account-
106. Michael D. Wright, "A Critique of the Public Choice Theory Case for Privatization: Rhetoric and Reality"
(1993) 25 Ottawa L. Rev. I at 7.
107 Ibid.
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ability and governmental provision of public goods increased, questions arose as to
whether an objective determination of the public interest could be reconciled with a
political system founded upon majoritarian principles. This is further complicated by
the fact that economic advantages have given some people a disproportionate influ-
ence on political decisions.
The limitations of majoritarian decision-making resulted in a new departure
point for economists and political scientists alike. In 1951, Kenneth Arrow intro-
duced a new approach that outlined new difficulties in majority rule by demon-
strating that it could not produce a definitive decision when confronted with a
plurality of choices. 10s "Arrow's theorem," as it is called, galvanized social science
efforts to ascertain the nature of human motivation and had a profound impact on
administrative lawyers as well. Borrowing Wright's example, the theory can be illus-
trated as follows:
Imagine three voters (legislators or citizens) who must choose among, death, dishonour
and poverty. The voters rank their preferences in the following order:
Number One--death, dishonour, and poverty
Number Two--dishonour, poverty, and death
Number Three-poverty, death, and dishonour
Now suppose the three voters are asked to choose any two of the options: death will be
preferred to dishonour by a majority made up of voters one and three; dishonour will be
favoured to poverty by voters one and two; and poverty will be chosen over death by
voters two and three. The result of this game is referred to as "cycling", because each
choice will produce a different majority, with no non-arbitrary stopping point. 109
In other words, this "cycling" makes it impossible to gauge which two of the
three options the decision makers will prefer most. Wright identifies this as part of
the first claim made by public choice theory. 10
The second claim as identified by Wright is the "interest group/capture"
claim, which is divided into two parts.
On the demand side it is argued that citizens accept more than an optimal amount of
government spending because they are under a misperception as to its true cost in taxes,
in part because of the complexity in the tax system. In addition, well organized and
financed interest groups that stand to gain from specific government programs will have
a greater incentive to lobby for these measures than unorganized individual taxpayers -
with their more diffuse interests - will have to oppose them. "'1
108. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Ist ed. (NewYork: JohnWley & Sons, 1951).
109. SeeWright, supra note 106 at 13-14.
110. Ibid. at 14
111. Ibid.
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The first part concerns voter misperceptions with respect to the true costs of
governmental programs on the fiscal side, "in part because of the complexity in the
tax system. " 'I2 The second part argues that:
... well organized and financed interest groups that stand to gain from specific govern-
ment programs will have a greater incentive to lobby for these measures than unorgan-
ized individual taxpayers - with their more diffuse interests - will have to oppose
them. According to the theory, these efforts by individuals and groups to further their
own interests, referred to as "rent-seeking", define the legislative process .... 113
Public choice theorists argue that "well-organized groups . . . enjoy superior
access to the political process" than ordinary citizens, with the result that legislation
is enacted with a view to transferring "wealth from society as a whole" to these groups
in particular (in the form of legislative concessions). " '4 This, the theory holds, harms
the public interest. I s
Many proponents of public choice theory argue in favour of the traditional
microeconomic behavioural assumption that individuals are primarily rational utility
maximizers who will naturally prefer to have others pay for benefits which they
themselves enjoy whenever possible ("free riders"). The free-rider effect hampers the
general interest since individual citizens do not have any pecuniary incentives to work
for the general interest because they can benefit from the actions of others. The free-
rider effect is what gives special-interest groups the power to exact rents, since these
groups derive specific benefits that those outside of the group cannot benefit from.
The notion that private interests influence public institutions is not one that
public choice theorists view as an external threat. Instead, they view it as one that is
internal to institutions as well. Public choice theorists import the assumption of
rational utility maximization into the political/legal realm. The effect of this mode of
thought is that discretionary decisions made by legislators and public officials are
viewed as decisions made to satisfy personal as opposed to public interests. The
notion that interests pull and tug at the state apparatus to satisfy private concerns to
the detriment of the public good (which "Arrow's theorem" proved was unascertain-
able) would appeal to both progressives and realists alike. 116 Gone is the Weberian
notion of the state as an independent third party to be replaced by an institution that
gives the rents of private interest groups the sanction and legitimacy of law."7
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. [footnotes omitted].
114. Jonathan R. Macey, "Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model" (1986) 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 at 230.
115. Wright, supra note 106 at 14.
116. David. B. Spence, "A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued" (2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 397 at 406-08.
117. Ibid. at 408, n. 38, citing Max Weber, "Bureaucracy" in Jay M. Schafritz & Albert C. Hyde, eds., Classics of
Public Administration (Oak Park, Ill.: Moore, 1978) at 23.
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Legal and political scholars alike began to see legislators as individuals who
sought vote maximization in order to increase their chances of re-election. This is
seen as being accomplished in two ways:
First, they maximize their appeal to constituents, by distributing goods and income
among those who vote according to their own economic self-interest .... 118 Second,
legislators conclude that since voters are generally ignorant, an election may turn on
financial backing, publicity and endorsements. 1
19
Consequently, electoral advantages can be gained through the financial back-
ing and organizational assistance acquired from interest groups in exchange for leg-
islative concessions. 120
Public choice theory also posits that legislators bargain among themselves, par-
ticularly within the context of a legislature that is devoid of party discipline. In such sys-
tems, successful passage of bills is accomplished by forming alliances among various
legislative blocks that cross party lines. This is particularly the case in the United States
Congress where there exists a "bilateral monopoly" over the enactment of legislation
between the President and the Congress. 2' As such, special-interest legislation tends to
be included in the form of riders to general public interest legislation, which the exec-
utive must endorse if it wishes to see passage of a favoured piece of legislation. 22 Such
bargaining also occurs between individual legislators with support being traded with
respect to particular bills for subsequent support for future bills in a quid pro quo fash-
ion known as "logrolling."23 Such behaviour has given rise to literature that attempts to
apply a game theory dimension to public choice. 2 4 One should note, however, that
Canadian rules of parliamentary procedure require that "amendments to legislative pro-
posals.., relate in some direct fashion to the core substance of the legislation."121 This,
coupled with constraints imposed by party discipline, severely constrains the ability of
legislators to "logroll" that is characteristic of the American Congress.
118. Wright, supra note 106 at 15, citing Sam Peltzman, "Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting" (1984) 27
J.L. & Econ. 181. Wright characterizes Peltzman's paper as "concluding that the more wealth distribution
caused by an issue, the better economic variables can explain the legislative outcome" (Wright, ibid. at n. 52).
119. Wright, ibid.
120. Ibid., citing Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991).
121. Glen 0. Robinson, "Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto" (1988) 74Va. L. Rev. 403, as cited in
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, "Public Choice Revisited", Book Review of Public Choice and Public Law:
Readings and Commentary by Maxwell L. Stearns (1998) 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1715 at 1721, n. 14.
122. Maxwell L. Stearns, "The Public Choice Case Against the ltemVeto" (1992) 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, as
cited in Farber & Frickey, ibid. at 1721, n. 15.
123. To expand upon this point further, logrolling is seen as an answer to the cycling problem. Here legislators
trade votes on matters toward which they are relatively indifferent, in exchange for votes on matters that are
of greater significance to them. See David A. Skeel Jr., "Public Choice and the Future of Public Choice-
Influenced Legal Scholarship", Book Review of Public Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary by
Maxwell L. Stearns (1997) SOVand. L. Rev. 647 at 655.
124. See Stephen W Salant & Theodore S. Sims, "Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?" (1996) 94
Mich. L. Rev. 1839.
125. John Saunders "Tax bill offering pork for all likely to wilt under Bush's veto" The Globe and Mail (24 October
1992)AI-2, as quoted in Keith Archer et al., Parameters of Power: Canada's Political Institutions (Toronto: Nelson
Canada, 1995) at 188.
120
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B. Commercial Law and Public Choice
Up until now, a vast majority of scholarship informed by public choice has
tended to focus on administrative law. Since this particular field of law tends to rely
on the decisions made by delegated authorities, this seemed like a natural departure
point for this method of analysis. However, the methodology need not be confined to
one particular area of law. Constitutional law, due to its overtly political nature, has
also become a popular point of reference for some public choice scholars.'2 6 Yet
another field of law in which public choice has been used to some success has been in
the commercial law context.
For the purposes of this paper, public choice debates within commercial law
are significant for a number of reasons. First is the recognition of the fact that many
policy decisions made in the commercial law context centre around debates over bal-
ancing the shifting of risk from one group to another. 27 Obviously, this involves an
overtly political dimension although the discourse that surrounds it tends to portray
this exercise as a means of increasing economic efficiency and of making gestures
(either real or merely symbolic) that are designed to boost confidence in the mar-
ketplace. 121 Moreover, legislation that falls within this category is commonly referred
to as "facilitation" rather than "regulation." This characterization is a means of por-
traying the exercise as one of an objective technocratic function as opposed to a sub-
jective political decision.'29
Second, public choice analysis has been applied to the actual drafting process-
es employed in the commercial law context, particularly in, but not limited to, the
United States. This usually takes the form of analyzing the law reform process typi-
cally adopted by way of recommendations made by "private legislatures". More com-
monly, this includes the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute. Such organizations usually rely on expert opin-
ions to guide and draft specific provisions of new or revised articles of existing laws
typically involving the UCC. The debates take place in a number of forums including
study groups, legislative task forces and conference programs. Participants include
industry and consumer representatives, academics, legal practitioners, bureaucrats
and legislators. 13 0
126. See for example Jonathan R. Macey, "Getting Beyond Cynicism: Cynicism andTrust in Politics and
Constitutional Theory" (2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 280. See also Edward L. Rubin, "Public Choice,
Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby"
(2002) 87 Cornell L. Rev. 309; Saul Levmore, "Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities" (2002) 3Theor.
Inq. L. 87; Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, "Judicial Review, the Congressional Process and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique" (2002) 111 Yale L.J. 1707.
127. lain Ramsay,"The Politics of Commercial Law" Commentary [20011 Wis. L. Rev. 565 at 566, citing Jean
Braucher, "Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce" [20011 Wis. L.
Rev. 527.
128. Ramsey, ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. See Norman 1. Silber, "Substance Abuse at UCC Drafting Sessions" (1997) 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 225.
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Legislatures lack a general familiarity with the discourse that shapes a partic-
ular area and hence, as Rubin observes:
Legislatures not only lack the expertise to draft operational rules.... A legislature will
have general jurisdiction over an area covered by dozens or hundreds of administrative
agencies, as well as over all other areas that are potentially subject to regulation, but not
yet regulated. The division of labor, a necessary organizing principle for any modern
state, demands that the great bulk of detailed rulemaking be performed by agencies. The
only other alternative would be for the legislature to bureaucratize itself, to add so many
staff members, and so many levels of command, that it would reproduce the structure of
the agencies it was attempting to replace. 131
Jonathan Macey maintains that banking law issues in the United States do not
have the political saliency as issues such as civil rights or foreign policy do and hence
few legislators find it in their interest to become knowledgeable about the complex-
ities of banking law policy. As a result, "even the most well-meaning legislators are
likely to be highly influenced by special interest groups"' 2 and, by extension, by the
institutions that they may have captured. Consequently, a public choice analysis would
go a long way toward exposing the political dimension of the law reform process both
substantively within the policy prescriptions that they may provide and proportion-
ally in the composition of their membership.
One would expect that substantial portions of the public choice literature
would be devoted toward how these institutions' internal machinations manifest
themselves in statutes and regulations. Indeed, such is the case with some recent lit-
erature on the subject. Ramsay observes that functionalism in commercial law tends
to be rationalized ex post as conforming to the facilitation discourse mentioned
above. 33 Another manifestation of this sort can be seen in the choice of a private leg-
islature between adopting a rule or a standard. In this case, "the choice of a rule rather
than a standard may reflect the victory of one group in the political process, where-
as standards represent a compromise where no one group was able to dominate."'
3 4
C. Interest Groups and the Policy-Making Process
Up until this point, it may be natural to assume that the competitors in the
political marketplace of ideas have equal bargaining power vis-a-vis elected represen-
tatives and the public at large. However, as will be seen, there are significant power
imbalances that can have a direct impact on the ability of interested parties to enact
their respective agendas. It would be impossible to engage in a public choice analysis
131. Rubin, "Payment System " , supra note 101 at 1267.
132. Jonathan R. Macey, "The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk" (1989) 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1277 at 1280.
133. Ramsay, supra note 127 at 568.
134. ibid. at 571, citing Robert Scott, "TheTruth About Secured Financing" (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1436; and
citing Alan Schwartz, "The Case for Specific Performance" (1979) 89Yale L.J. 271.
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of any sort without some basic understanding of the power dynamics involved that
determine the ultimate success or failure of a particular constituency in enacting its
agenda. In the present case of rights and liabilities as they relate to consumer debit
card purchases, one ought to remember that each of the interested parties has wide-
ly divergent issues and agendas.
On the card issuers' side, the concern is to maximize profits in a manner that
presents the lowest transaction costs possible. Compliance with legal regimes that
require disclosure and that impose losses upon banks in the event of unauthorized
transactions only serves to increase transaction costs, thereby either reducing profits
at the margin or resulting in higher costs being passed on to consumers. This, in turn,
diminishes consumer demand for these types of financial products. Financial institu-
tions must find a way to stimulate consumer demand for their products by reducing
the substitution effect that can occur between products that have different liabilities
as a result of the legal regimes that govern them. Consequently, efforts to maximize
profits are tempered by the need to stimulate demand for new products that may
come under less protective legal regimes than easily available substitutes. Lobbying
efforts are thus concerned with balancing the need to minimize exposure to
consumer-initiated losses with the need to find a critical mass for future products and
to maintain goodwill toward existing ones.
Not surprisingly, consumers, on the other hand, have a different agenda alto-
gether. They would like to see their exposure to losses limited as much as possible.
Moreover, they would like to conduct transactions for the lowest possible traiisaction
costs. Competition between products and transparency in contratual terms is seen
as a crucial means for ensuring that consumers have access to the products that they
demand at the lowest possible prices. Limiting legal liability for unauthorized trans-
actions and increasing access to information are key concerns of consumer advocates.
They, in turn, wish to minimize the costs and liabilities that are imposed upon them
by the rules and regulations that are ultimately adopted.
From the legislative branch, this group can be divided into two subgroups.
First there are the legislators themselves, the individual Members of Parliament. This
group will be on the lookout for issues of concern to the public. They will seek to
maximize their chances of re-election and will seek whatever advantages accomplish
this. They may either choose to rely on the assistance provided by special-interest
groups, or ignore this altogether, preferring to rely instead on issues that motivate the
public (see discussion below). This may either come in the form of members con-
vincing their party to adopt a position that might allow it to gain an electoral advan-
tage, or it might culminate in the efforts of an individual member to introduce a
private member's bill in an attempt to increase his or her personal popularity (more
on this below).
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The second of the subgroups consists of the civil servants who staff individual
governmental departments and ministries. Individual members of this subgroup will
be keen to bring the matter under the jurisdiction of their particular department.
They will be interested in being able to bring their particular level of expertise to
bear on the subject and in attempting to influence the development of rules in this
area. They will want to bring as much prominence to their department as they can in
order to maximize the value of their contribution and to convince their political mas-
ters to entrust them with greater responsibilities in the future (see discussion below).
Undoubtedly, individual members of the card issuer and consumer groups will
find it advantageous to lobby government collectively in order to advance their inter-
ests. As the discussion above has demonstrated, many of the features present in the
Debit Code do give a comparative advantage to Canadian business interests. Yet the
question remains, why does a power imbalance continue to exist between these two
groups? Interest group theory may provide an answer to this question. Mancur Olson
has hypothesized that part of the problem stems from the fact that what is at stake on
the part of consumers is the policy goal of changing regulations in their favour, which
can be characterized as a public good. Assuming that individuals are rational utility
maximizers, Olson concludes that when a public good such as legislation intended to
benefit all members of society is introduced, people will refrain from joining or par-
ticipating in these groups preferring instead to free ride on the efforts of others.'3 5
Those groups that were able to overcome the free-rider problem were those
that, according to Olson, were able to provide their members with "selective incentives
that were unrelated to the supply of the public good."'36 Selective incentives are
defined as benefits that only members of an organization can receive. As a result,
Olson found that small constituencies of interests such as business lobbies tend to be
the most effective at overcoming the collective action problem. This is the case since
their small constituencies are seeking relatively concentrated benefits while their
costs are widely spread (usually upon the backs of consumers through marginally
higher prices). As a corollary, large constituencies such as consumer groups that rep-
resent broad interests seeking very diffuse benefits whose costs might be concentrat-
ed among other groups would have a difficult time in enacting their agenda. I 7
135. See Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1965), as described in Gary J. Miller, "The Impact of Economics on Contemporary
Political Science" (1997) 3S Journal of Economic Literature 1173 at 1177.
136. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
137. Archer et al., supra note 125 at 479.
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In Canada, the leading group that speaks on behalf of large fimancial institu-
tions is the Canadian Bankers' Association (CBA,), which was first founded in
1887. ' This group has maintained a permanent lobbyist in Ottawa since 1894.139
Unlike traditional interest groups, membership in this association is not voluntary but
rather is mandated by its Act of incorporation. 14The CBA maintains a series of close
relationships with many governmental departments and agencies, including the
Office of the Inspector General of Banks, the Department of Finance and the Bank of
Canada. Quite frequently, these agencies rely upon the CBA to provide them with
expertise relating to banking regulation and its execution. For instance, banking per-
sonnel have served in the Department of Finance for periodic stints of service. 14' The
Office of the Inspector General of Banks has relied upon bank-employed auditors to
carry out its work. 142
The close connection that results from the interaction between the CBA and
government allows this organization to have access to senior levels of policy makers
and allows it to wield considerable influence in having its voice heard. No such
opportunities may be available to consumer groups that have to contend with the
free-rider problem. As a result of free-riding, these groups may not have the neces-
sary economic resources to assemble a competent full-time staff that can compete
with the CBA on a par level. Moreover, due to its structural composition, the inter-
ests among the members of the CBA tend to be more monolithic than those of con-
sumers. This coupled with its impressive economic influence have made the CBA a
formidable force in the policy-making process and, as a result, one can infer that they
have a "highly dominant position." 14
Yet the dominant economic and political influence of the CBA is not the only
factor that consumer groups must overcome if they wish their voices to be heard. As
an industry insider, the CBA enjoys additional privileges. Professor Coleman main-
tains that business groups in general have a more attentive audience within govern-
mental circles than do other groups because "the demands of business leaders, given
their overall responsibility for the economy, take on the appearance of being in the
general interest of society. By comparison, those opposing business often appear to
be arguing on the basis of a narrow or special interest." 44 While this may not always
138. William D. Coleman, Business and Politics:A Study of Collective Action (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1988) at 184.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid. at 185.
141. Ibid.
142. William D. Coleman, Financial Services, Globaization and Domestic Policy Change (London: MacMillan Press
Ltd., 1996) at 218 [Coleman, "Financial Services].
143. Ibid. at 225.
144. William D. Coleman, "One Step Ahead: Business in the Policy Process in Canada" in Mark Charlton & Paul
Barker, eds., Crosscurrents. Contemporary Political laes, 2d ed. (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1994) 338 at 340.
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tip the balance in favour of business interests, it is claimed that more often than not,
business will arrive at a favourable outcome and their representations will be listened
to very carefully.145 Moreover,
... interchanges between the state and business will usually appear to be technical in
character.... Discussions between the two often centre on... the best approach for
maximizing economic growth... while not harming unduly other individuals or groups
in society individuals. Problems to be resolved are thus practical, demanding specialized
discussions and knowledge. 46
This specialized knowledge may be beyond the reach of consumer groups.
And yet, by the same token, all is not lost for the efforts of those who would
oppose interests with greater economic resources and access points into the policy-
making process. While many groups may lack the organizational infrastructure that
established interest groups possess, they may still be able to affect policy outcomes
nonetheless. Paul Pross identifies groups that he refers to as "issue-oriented" interest
groups that lack the organizational cohesion and staying power of groups such as the
CBA. Such groups" ...spring up at a moment's notice, usually in reaction to some
government action or a private-sector activity that only government can change." 47
Historically, many of the more effective social advocacy groups that currently enjoy
a more institutional status have their genealogy in these movements including groups
such as Greenpeace and Pollution Probe. '1This fact ought to be borne in mind when
one considers the historical development of debit card regulation in North America.
111. A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
One will recall that public choice theory posits that, in normal circumstances,
a decision-maker cannot be relied upon to make a decision that is solely in the pub-
lic interest as a result of the principle of individual rational utility maximization. 49
On a cynical level, this is a function of the amount of support from payoffs that a deci-
sion maker can expect from distributing rents among groups. Much depends upon
the political saliency/voter elasticity of a particular issue. 150 It is submitted that con-
sumer payment issues which may result in pecuniary losses for individuals are exam-
ples of these types of issues. As the examples pertaining to the early regulation of
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid. at 343 [emphasis in original].
147. A. Paul Pross, "Pressure Groups:Talking Chameleons"in Michael S. Whittington & Glen Williams, eds.,
Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 4' ed. (Toronto: Nelson Canada, 1995) 252-at 261.
148. Ibid.
149. Wright, supra note 106 at 5.
150. Spence, supa note 116 at 423.
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credit and debit cards in the United States clearly demonstrate, these issues are of the
type that tends to energize consumers and have historically resulted in gains for
them. Another such example is the US Expedited Funds Availability Act.' 5'
More recent examples include the following:
In the late 199 0s, banks began aggressively marketing debit cards as an alternative to
credit cards. These cards, marketed with a credit card brand name, had the same conven-
ience for the consumer as credit cards, but very different consumer protections.
Consumers and consumer advocates were shocked by the magnitude of the disparity in
consumer protection provisions for debit and credit cards.... In 1997, Visa USA and
MasterCard International announced they would not rely on the full protections accord-
ed debit card issuers under Regulation E, but would voluntarily narrow the gap between
the treatment of unauthorized or erroneous transactions for debit and credit cards....
They agreed to limit consumer liability for unauthorized transactions to the same $50
that applies to credit cards, and to shorten the time a financial institution is permitted to
make the decision whether to recredit a customer's account for an allegedly unauthorized
withdrawal. 1
5 2
The preceding examples demonstrate that, in many instances, card issuers
themselves will take pre-emptive action in order to reassure consumers that their
concerns are being addressed.Yet, it may still be possible to reconcile this occurrence
with public choice theory. Fred McChesney has suggested that one strand of public
choice theory could posit that in certain instances, decision-makers could be con-
vinced by private interests not to subject them to regulation. Thus, in this instance,
rents are not being provided but rather decision-makers choose to refrain from reg-
ulating in exchange for benefits in a complementary fashion with traditional rent
distribution.,5 3
It may be possible to view the evolution of the Debit Code with a slightly mod-
ified view of McChesney's proposition. When the Debit Code was being developed,
card issuers were aware of the fact that consumers would in all likelihood express dis-
satisfaction with the terms found in cardholder agreements. The increasing popular-
ity of debit cards, combined with the potential for high-profile incidents of
consumers being disadvantaged through unauthorized transactions, would make
debit cards an attractive political target for regulation. As David Spence states:
151. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-10 (1988).This Act was passed in response to industry practices present in the late
19 80's. At the time, bankers were "placing 'holds' on deposited checks, so that customers were required to
wait for days, or weeks, before they were able to withdraw their funds": Rubin, "Payment System", supra
note 106 at 1257. A surge of consumer complaints would lead the US Congress to take action (Rubin,
"Payment System", ibid.)The Act, implemented through Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. § 229 (1997), requires
that funds are made available to consumers according to specified time schedules.
152. Winn, "Clash of the Titans", supra note 26. Note that Canadian debit cards, unlike those in the United States,
are not marketed under credit card brand names.
153. Fred S. McChesney, "Purchasing Political Inaction: How Regulators Use the Threat of Legal "Reform"To
Extort Payoffs" (1997) 21 Harv. J.L & Pub- Pol'y 241 at 2 [3-215.
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• . . politicians can help broader, less wealthy, mass interest groups to overcome
Olsonian disadvantages, particularly in higher-salience policy debates. In debates over
the kind of high-salience issues that produce major regulatory legislation (the kind that
establish an agency's general mission), politicians act as political entrepreneurs, recog-
nizing the political benefits of rallying the unorganized supporters of public interest pol-
icy goals. This is the so-called "republican moment" explanation for major regulatory
legislation, one that echoes Anthony Downs's description of the "issue attention cycle".
. .. [R]epubican moments ought to produce policies that reflect the median voter's
wishes; when an issue captures the public's imagination, legislators face greater electoral
risk and have a strong disincentive to deviate from their constituents' wishes. The same
cannot be said of the kind of lower-salience, second-order decisions that legislators
often delegate to agencies. 1
54
As a result, the industry saw that it was in its interest to participate in an infor-
mal process initiated by government to promulgate a code that would initially rely
upon moral suasion as an enforcement mechanism.
In this sense then, the knowledge that regulation may be inevitable could have
convinced the industry to participate in this forum in order to have a hand in "miti-
gating the damage" that could be caused by unilateral government action. Such
actions have been traditionally determinative factors in choosing to engage in volun-
tary regulation by means of a code.5 5 In this manner, government could be convinced
that this course of action would overcome the constitutional hurdles that were pres-
ent and would be a means whereby the Debit Code could be easily updated in order to
"adapt to the changing marketplace." Yet, as was stated earlier, should the govern-
ment have chosen to, it could have charged the Canadian Payments Association with
this mandate and relied upon the more stringent enforcement mechanisms available
to it as opposed to those available in the Debit Code. Moreover, the argument that the
"soft law" approach was more flexible than traditional forms of regulation seems
somewhat suspect given the nature of the regulation of financial institutions in
Canada. For example, no such problem is present in Canada's regulation of banks and
banking. The Bank Act has been revised on average every ten years since its inception
and the law mandates this revision. 15 6
Moreover, the Debit Code could also be beneficial to card issuers financially
since, as was the case with Regulation E, it would help placate the concerns of con-
sumer advocacy groups and lead to increased acceptability of the product. As further
justification, the Australian experience with a similar code was cited as a good exam-
154. Spence, supra note 116 at 436.
155. Industry Canada, An Evaluative Framework for Voluntary Codes (Ottawa: Office of Consumer Affairs,
2000), online: Industry Canada: <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ca/evalu.pdf> at 3-6.
156. Bank Act, S.C. 1991,c. 46, s. 21.
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ple of a "soft law" approach that did not have the "rigidity" of the American counter-
part. " However, it ought to be noted that, when the federal and state governments
released the Australian Code of Conduct, it was accompanied by the warning that legis-
lation would follow if its recommendations were not met. 158
While issuers had attempted to mitigate the repercussions of a governmental
desire to regulate, they realized that this exercise had to extend beyond a symbolic
gesture. Previous incidents regarding credit and debit cards in the United States, as
outlined above, impressed upon issuers the fact that these issues could not be ignored
until politicians found it expedient to embrace consumer causes. The consent and
participation of consumer groups could furnish a means of demonstrating to govern-
ment that efforts to regulate were unnecessary since consumer groups had lent their
support to the exercise. Concessions made to these groups could also be used as
leverage against them in arguing that they would have more policy input at this stage
of the process than they would in subsequent phases. Yet, as the previous discussion
illustrates, by acquiescing to the process and voluntarily choosing to self-regulate,
industry representatives succeeded in shifting a greater proportion of loss allocation
rules toward consumers than might otherwise have been the case. Despite similari-
ties to Regulation E on the surface, the Debit Code would still manage to confer sub-
stantial benefits to issuers who had successfully managed to "capture" the agenda, to
borrow a phrase from public choice.
Much of this argument stems from assumptions made by some public choice
theorists regarding human motivations, which are still the object of debate within the
literature. As a normative theory, public choice has been criticized for failing to prove
its assumptions empirically.'5 9 It is puzzling indeed to see how some public choice
proponents of a laissez-faire political position can assert that certain human behav-
ioural traits are present within government, yet they remain silent in ascribing these
very same traits to private sector actors. 160 One such example is a point made by
Professor Macey in a recent article. Macey contends that government bureaucracies
suffer from tension that is derived from norm internalization of members of the pub-
lic service who, in turn, lobby to have their agencies discharge their duties in a man-
ner that best reflects the norms of their respective professions.16 l It is then argued
that this exercise is also one of personal career advancement.
157. Hayhoe, supra note 35 at 355.
158. Ibid.
159. Wright, supra note 106 at 17-18.
160. Ibid. at 18.
161. Macey, supra note 126 at 287.
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Building upon the Frye-Shleifer model, Macey borrows the example of a
lawyer working in government who not only wishes to adopt an approach that uses
legal skills, but who also seeks to develop those skills in the hope of landing a job with
a well-paying, prestigious law firm. 162 Fair enough. Yet one must ask whether such a
situation could be replicated in the private sphere. Is it not hard to imagine this situ-
ation reproducing itself in the context of corporate counsel? Moreover, what about
the case of a lawyer working within a law firm who is seeking to expand contact with
the firm's clients and staff with the hope of someday luring them away from the
employer to a firm that the lawyer hopes to establish independently? Why is it that
self-serving, rational utility maximization is seen to be an affliction leading to the
ineffectiveness of the political process, but not of the private sector, in which laissez-
faire proponents would have us place our faith in to find a solution?
One possible answer to these queries may be to argue that the market sub-
jects its participants to greater discipline than does the political system.Yet one must
bear in mind that one cannot speak of the market as a monolith. Moreover, given the
fact that profits and share prices are measured in relative terms on the stock
exchange, industry-wide inefficiencies may be treated as the norm. Analogously, is
there any reason to suspect that the difficulties associated with running a large
bureaucratic structure are not present in a large multinational corporation, which,
despite its profitability, must still confront the same problems?' 6 As the consumer
debit card example demonstrates, the market solution to market failures may not
always be satisfactory.
By failing to consider alternative institutions and by focusing single-mindedly
on the shortcomings of governmental regulation, laissez-faire public choice theorists
are doing a great disservice to the public interest in general. Much of this type of
analysis tends to assume that once the public choice problem is identified within the
state, there is nothing that can be done to remedy the situation, apart from jettison-
ing state regulation. In this manner, market self-regulation or laissez-faire situations,
are presumed to be better by default. Such an orientation leads to the perpetuation
of a vicious circle. After all, how can a problem that originates as a market failure ever
hope to be resolved in the market-the very institution that gave rise to the problem
in the first place? Public choice scholars, particularly those of the laissez-faire school,
162. Ibid. at 286-87.
163. Moreover, when one speaks of corporations, one must bear in mind that their goals and aspirations are not
static. Rather, they are path dependent. The current model of shareholder value maximization is an example
where managers of corporations are concerned with managing share prices and engaging in activities that
have short-term benefits, as opposed to working in the long-run interests of the corporation, its employees
and the public. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, "A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance" (1999) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127. For another perspective see Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 439.
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should be prepared to extend their analysis to the private sector itself before assess-
ing whether or not the market or the government should perform a particular func-
tion. Otherwise, we are unduly limiting the scope of our analysis and we are failing
to utilize a comparative approach in order to identify improvements in institutional
design, which may go a long way toward addressing the issue of capture.
If we accept at face value the central proposition of public choice theory, that
individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest (which recent literature is
demonstrating may not be the case,) 164 then why is such scepticism confined only to
public institutions? Why are the self-interested motivations of industry also not called
into question by laissez-faire theorists? This does not necessarily apply with respect to
firm conduct vis-h-vis each other, which is allegedly cured by the market, but rather
should be looked at from the perspective of the industry, as a whole, vis-6-vis third
parties. Could it be that industry advocates of the Debit Code suffer from this affliction
and are looking to halt a potentially embarrassing and costly incident from occurring?
A. The Desirability of Codes of Conduct Generally
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine that the preceding train of thought did not
inform the motivations of the industry when they were advocating that a code ought
to be the proper form of regulation for this particular product. The analysis needs to
consider what incentives industry had in order to concentrate their efforts upon the
promulgation of a code as opposed to confining their standard lobbying efforts on the
legislature. After all, a watered down form of legislation would more than likely have
generated the desired effect. Speaking in the context of voluntary codes that are
found in the labour sector, Harry Arthurs states that they bring employers the advan-
tage of "no legal controls or sanctions, lower compliance costs (or none), and good
publicity eclipsing bad."' 65 Professor Arthurs goes on to state that the advantages for
government include "[being] seen to be ... responsive without provoking negative
reactions from investors, breaking current ideological taboos against regulation, or
incurring the transaction costs associated with inspection, prosecution, and other tra-
ditional forms of intervention."' 66 If a particular instance of self-regulation should
fail, government could be free to act in all good conscience that regulation was indeed
a last resort.' 67
164. See Raymond Boudon, "Beyond Rational Choice Theory" (2003) 29 Annual Review of Sociology 1.
165. Harry Arthurs, "Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct
as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation" in Joanne Conaghan, Richard Michael Fischl & Karl Klare, eds.,
Labour Law in an Era of Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002) 471 at 482.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
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As was mentioned earlier, commercial law reform tends to emphasize the
facilitative nature of regulation in appearing to make markets more responsive and
competitive in order to promote economic objectives. Voluntary codes in Canada are
no different. In the introduction to a recent Canadian government report, the
Canadian Minister of Industry stated that:
Voluntary codes represent an innovative approach to addressing the concerns and needs
of consumers, workers and citizens while at the same time helping Canadian companies to
be more competitive.... A supplement and, in some circumstances, an alternative to tra-
ditional regulatory approaches, voluntary codes can be inexpensive, effective and flexible
market instruments. 
168
This statement nicely demonstrates the contention that voluntary codes have
been seen, on a conceptual level, to conform to the discourse of market facilitation.
This is an area where financial institutions can naturally assert their expertise in eco-
nomic affairs and ensure that the transaction costs associated with compliance are
minimized. This would surely fit into some of the capture claims made by Professor
Macey and his followers!
The voluntary code approach can provide a crucial bypass around the legisla-
tive process. However, one has to consider the costs of doing so. First is the argument
that the "stakeholder" model is not particularly well suited to the regulation of debit
cards. After all, consumer protection for unauthorized debit card transactions is con-
sidered to be a public good. Theoretically, everyone in Canada who makes a payment
has a vested interest in its regulation. In such an instance, how can one justify the
exclusion of legislators, who are elected by the public for the purposes of safeguard-
ing the public interest at large? This is not an issue that is confined to a small segment
of the population. Who gets to decide which groups of individuals constitute legiti-
mate "stakeholders" that ought to be invited into the policy-making process?
Secondly, bypassing Parliament has brought some additional difficulties. One
ought to recall that the Westminster model, with significant party discipline, is delib-
erately set up as an adversarial system. As a result, self-interested opposition parties
seek to expose flaws in government-sponsored bills and hold the government
accountable for its actions. Bills that are proposed must also pass through a commit-
tee structure in both chambers that is designed to cure defects in drafting. All pro-
ceedings are a matter of public record and the results of the legislative process are
168. Industry Canada &Treasury Board Secretariat, Voluntary Codes-A Guidefor Their Development and Use intro-
duction by John Manley, Minister of Industry & Marcel Mass6, President of the Treasury Board (Ottawa:
Office of Consumer Affairs & the Regulatory Affairs Division, 1998), as quoted in Arthurs, supra note 165 at
485 [emphasis added].
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widely reported to the citizenry by the media. By going through the voluntary code
process, many of the proceedings are conducted behind closed doors, without the
increased scrutiny of the parliamentary process. As such, the matter can appear to be
resolved politically even though the details have yet to be tested and debated.
Whether or not these defects are sufficiently publicized and seized upon by the oppo-
sition or by the government of the day remains to be seen since, up to the present,
there is no systemic or ongoing mechanism to determine industry compliance and
consumer satisfaction with the present legal regime. 169
IV. THE ANALYSIS AND ITS UTILITY
Traditional theories of public choice have been criticized for failing to explain
differences between regulations that pertain to different financial products. Professor
Gillette argues that a public choice analysis fails to explain why regulations with
respect to cheque and card regulation in the United States have taken their present
form. 70 As Gillette points out:
If financial institutions are truly dominant before private legislatures, then we would
expect to see regulations arising out of the [American Law Institute] that are as precise as
those arising out of Congress, because financial institutions would want to protect the
deal they have struck within the legislative body they dominate. Instead, the risk alloca-
tions relating to consumer check fraud are defined by vague negligence standards. Such
vagueness suggests a compromise among competing interest groups, none of which could
enact its favored agenda. Standards may indicate that the drafters were confronted with
competing claims from multiple groups and desired to avoid giving offense to any of
them, because offense would create reputational injury in future dealings with the losing
group. One way to accomplish that objective would be to draft a standard that shifts to
some subsequent decision[-]maker, e.g., a court, the obligation to make the difficult
choice among competitors. '
7 1
169. In 2002 Industry Canada commissioned EKOS Research Associates Inc. (EKOS) to conduct a study on the
nature and extent of operational adherence to the Debit Code. Despite industry representations that self-
monitoring is working, one can call this assertion into question as a result of the discrepancies in the data which
was provided to EKOS. Of the ten institutions asked to submit call centre complaint data, only four institutions
did so, and of those four, only two institutions provided aggregate complaint data at the level of detail request-
ed. See Industry Canada, Highlights from: Evaluation of Operations Related to the Canadian Code of Practice
for Consumer Debit Card Services (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2002), online: Industry Canada
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inocabc.nsf/vwapj/EKS-eng.pdf/$FILE/EKS-eng.pdf> at 5. It
is also interesting to note for the purposes of this paper that EKOS found that financial institutions' "[clardhold-
er agreements are often not in conformity with the [Debit Code] provisions with respect to cardholder liability
for loss and in particular, that cardholders are not responsible for losses beyond their control" (ibid. at 34). The
study also found that one third of cardholder respondents were unaware of the limits to their liability in the
event of an unauthorized transaction (ibid. at 19).
170. Clayton P. Gillette, "Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems" (1996) 82 Va. L. Rev. 181.
171. Ibid. at 199 [footnotes omitted).
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The preceding point serves to reinforce the contention made earlier, that the
effectiveness of rent seeking and distribution is a function of the political elastici-
ty/saliency of the issue under consideration. Clearly, instances can be adduced where
an interest group has been successful in dominating a legislative agenda and deriving
rents. Yet it is argued that this ability is circumscribed by practical political consider-
ations. Industry advocacy groups also take into account their long-term interests. A
callous and capricious attitude toward consumer concerns regarding debit cards
would give rise to the emergence of Pross' issue-oriented groups, which may result
in harsh legislation being adopted that would be even more detrimental to industry
interests. As Stanbury notes, "[niothing promotes reform like well-publicized excess-
es."17 2 In addition, the relative power among groups is dynamic and largely depends
on the particular context within which this power is exercised. 73 Context is defimed
by Stanbury to include "the nature of the specific issue(s), the timing of the group's
actions, the temporal context (e.g. stage in the electoral cycle), and the amount of
effort exerted by the group."7 4 As a result, the interplay of these dynamics can give a
group, who normally may be insignificant in the policy-making process, higher influ-
ence at different times.
Moreover, it would be foolhardy indeed for any politician, sincere or other-
wise, to be seen as endorsing the interests of large commercial financial institutions
to the detriment of consumers or of the economy as a whole.' Symbolism is not
enough to rectify this situation since, in the event of a large unauthorized transaction,
a voter would be consistently reminded of its significance whenever viewing his or
her banking transactions. Increased political saliency, coupled with the need for con-
sumer support, lobbying and electoral efforts, provide regulators with an incentive
to produce effective legislation and give more strength to their ability to regulate via
moral suasion. Conversely, while some modest gains have been made, the previous
analysis demonstrates that much more needs to be done in order to adequately safe-
guard consumer rights and interests.
A. Differences between Outcomes in the US and Canada
Returning once again to the point made by Professor Gillette regarding the
difference in outcomes, in assessing the utility of the public choice analysis, one needs
to account for differences between the two jurisdictions. Once again, interest group
172. WT. Stanbury, "Assessing the Political Power of Business Interests" in Chariton & Barker, supra note 144, 347
at 355.
173. Ibid. at 349 [footnotes omitted].
174. ibid.
175. See, for example, the enduring opposition of successive Ministers of Finance to proposed bank
mergers/industry consolidation in Canada.
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analysis may furnish an additional explanation. Professor Coleman argues that an
interest group's "density of representation" is one determining factor of its ability to
influence the public policy process.' 76 Professor Coleman writes: "If an association
can claim that it represents firms responsible for all of the business activity in a sec-
tor, then its legitimacy in forums with public officials will be enhanced", with the
converse being true for those with a smaller density. '
As we have seen, in Canada the financial services lobby is a very cohesive
group as a result of the mandated nature of its membership. The CBA currently has
no immediate rivals that can compete with it on a par level. Recent consolidations
among the four pillars of the financial system (banks, trust companies, investment
firms and insurance companies) only serve to reinforce this fact. In the United States,
by contrast, there does exist substantial competition. On an aggregate level, there
were 54 banks in operation in Canada as of 1998 with the six major banks holding the
overwhelming majority of deposits. 17 8 In contrast, the United States had 12 000 banks
in operation at the same period. 17 9 As Professor Coleman notes:
The sheer number of firms presents a difficult challenge for any association like the
American Bankers Association (ABA), or the US League of Savings Institutions, or the
Credit Union National Association (CUNA) which seek to represent a whole subsector.
The decentralized nature of federal government regulation, the existence of dual banking
at the federal and state levels, and the dynamics of a congressional legislative system all
offer incentives for interests to differentiate themselves. The task of a comprehensive
association becomes even more daunting in this environment.t1°
Moreover, competition among firms of different sizes also leads to increased frag-
mentation in the US market. Various organizations exist to represent such diverse
interests as independent locally-owned banks, banks with a particular interest in the
payment system, banks that deal exclusively with government securities and banks
owned by minority groups, to name a few. I As such, the ability of any interest group
advocating financial interests in the United States is constrained by this fact.
The fragmentary nature of the US financial services lobby may be a possible
explanation as to why US financial services providers were not as successful in enact-
ing their agenda as their Canadian counterparts. The level of fragmentation would
have made fighting off the claims made by consumer groups more difficult, particu-
176. Coleman, "Financial Services", supra note 142 at S3.
177. Ibid.
178. Angie Barrados, Banking on Consumer Power: The Issues for a Canadian Consumer Coalition for the
Banking Industry (Ottawa: Public Interest Advocacy Centre, 1998), online: Library and Archives Canada
<http://collection.nlc-bnc.ca/100/200/301/taskforce-cdn-fin/subnission-e/79/piac1.pdf*> at 22.
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180. Coleman, "Financial Services", supra note 142 at 50.
181. Ibid. at SO-S1.
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larly in light of the high-profile incidents that were described above. The power dif-
ferential between the CBA and its US counterparts could be an explanation as to why
one sees more precise consumer protection terms in the US legislation than are pres-
ent in the Canadian Debit Code. As we saw, many of the differences between the two
are subtle, yet the differences present in the Debit Code lead to a much more lax con-
sumer protection regime. Part of this fact stems from the approach of using a code,
which is written in informal language designed to make it more "user friendly," but
may, in effect, make violations more difficult to prove. 182yet, vagueness in its language
and the subtle differences in the operational aspects of the Debit Code lead one to
believe that the CBA does enjoy a more substantial power base than its counterparts.183
While this may account for differences in the comparative power of the busi-
ness interest groups, one must still account for differences in the power of consumer
groups. One will recall that consumers face particular difficulties as a result of the
collective action problem as outlined by Olson. While Olson's theories have helped
to explain why business groups have managed to maintain a prominent role in the
political process, they do not account for the rise of numerous public-interest advo-
cacy groups. To quote from Tarrow: "It is ironic that Olson's work ... was published
just as the western world was erupting in a paroxysm of protest, riot, rebellion, and
increased political involvement. " "
Walker has sought to explain why one witnesses an increase of issue-oriented
groups in the 1970s and '80s, which Olson's model failed to predict. One of the ways
that he sought to explain how these groups overcame the free-rider problem was that
often, the state supports these groups financially, thereby overcoming the problem.
As Walker states:
... the formation of new groups was one of the consequences of major new legislation,
not one of the causes of its passage. A pressure model of the policymaking process in
which an essentially passive legislature responds to petitions from groups of citizens who
have spontaneously organized because of common social or economic concerns must
yield to a model in which influences for change come as much from inside the govern-
ment as from beyond its institutional boundaries.... 185
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Hence, the approach is to examine the outcome in terms of a dynamic two-
sided process of one where interests not only shape institutions, but rather, are also
shaped by them in turn.
One would expect, then, that the more successful a consumer group could
be at overcoming the free-rider problem, the more successful it could be at being
able to counteract the influence of business. As was mentioned above, part of this is
a function of the degree to which a consumer organization can attract sufficient
financial support from government and individual members. One obstacle that con-
sumer groups in Canada are faced with is competition from US groups. Selective
incentives from US consumer groups, such as offering Consumer Reports, a high-
quality magazine devoted to these issues, hinders the revenue-generating efforts of
their Canadian counterparts. 16 While these publications are suitable in gauging the
US marketplace, they are not particularly accurate in their assessments of the
Canadian marketplace. I7
Moreover, consumer organizations in the United States have been successful
in obtaining additional sources of revenue to supplement their research activities. In
his survey of seven industrialized nations, Professor Kerton found that:
... the US has a policy action group, the Consumer's Federation of America, a research
association, the American Council on Consumer Interests, Nader-inspired Public Interest
Research Groups and specific financial sector groups like the four Citizens' Utility
Boards financed by donations in response to mailouts included in bank statements. 1
88
Other jurisdictions, such as California and three other states, also mandate a
check-off scheme for financial consumers as a method of financing consumer input in
the policy-making process. 8 9
Despite the best efforts of Industry Canada to include consumer groups in the
policy-making process, Professor Kerton has found that Canadian consumer groups
have a profound lack of technical expertise when compared to their counterparts
elsewhere. A lack of public funding has necessitated reliance upon voluntary expert-
ise'90 that has manifested itself in the lower level of consumer protections found in
the Debit Code. One must once again place this fact in its proper historical context.
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One will recall that the adoption of the Debit Code occurred at the same time as one
of Canada's most heated constitutional debates. That debate generated a significant
amount of backlash by "grassroots" movements concerned about the allegedly dis-
proportionate influence of "special interests" in the policy-making process. This
result would lead to increased calls to decrease public funding of interest groups in
future years as governments sought to eliminate expenditures in order to fight
accumulated deficits.191
Looking back at the development of the Debit Code in particular, the two pub-
lic interest groups that were involved in the initial consulting and drafting phases
were the Canadian Consumer's Association (CAC) and representatives of a coalition
of Quebec Consumer Associations"92 (most recently represented since 2002 by
Options Consommateurs).' 93 The former association was one of the first to bring the
issue of debit card regulation to the forefront. The CAC was in some financial diffi-
culty during the early 1990s when the Debit Code was introduced. In 1993, the CAC
was forced to abandon production of its magazine, Canadian Consumer, and was com-
pelled to accept logistical support from its American counterpart, the Consumer's
Union (CU). The CU agreed to distribute the CAC newsletter to its 200 000
Canadian subscribers and also include CAC membership inserts on condition that the
CAC not accept any corporate support.'94 While this did have the positive effect of
enhancing the profile of the CAC, it also helps illustrate the preceding point that
competition from American groups is hurting Canadian public-interest groups
through competition between jurisdictions for the support of like-minded individu-
als hoping to achieve change.
On the governmental side, we also see a noticeable difference between the two
jurisdictions that may be explained temporally as well. Politically, the 1970s saw less
emphasis on cooperation between government, industry and the citizenry than the
1990s did. As a result of economic downturns that occurred in the early 1980s and
again in the 1990s, North America moved toward a more neo-liberal stance that
emphasized the limitations of the state as opposed to its virtues. Professionally, as we
saw in the previous section, this entailed a greater emphasis on business facilitation, as
opposed to regulation, which was closer to the American approach in the 1970s. The
consequence of this mode of thought was a greater reliance on a "consultative" culture
190. Ibid.
191. Pross, supra note 147 at 269-72.
192. Canadian Code of Practice supra note 47.
193. Industry Canada Strategis
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that emphasized the solicitation of views from stakeholders so that decision-makers
could become aware of "impacts" that their decisions would have. ' 95 Since many of the
individuals involved in government and in the industry tend to come from economics
backgrounds, 96 these discussions tend to focus on considerations of efficiency, as was
outlined above, and to place less of an emphasis on ensuring that citizens' rights are
not infringed.' 97 Indeed, as the initial discussion stated, one of the reasons why
Industry Canada itself chose to proceed with a code was because it was seen as a "flex-
ible" instrument that could be easily adaptable to changing circumstances.1 9
The temporal context is also an important reason why we witness a difference
in approaches between Canada and the United States. One will recall that American
regulations with respect to debit cards were introduced after various high-profile
credit card incidents that were reported in the media shook consumer confidence in
the ability of issuers to safeguard consumer interests. The Canadian Debit Code was
promulgated before any high-profile reports appeared in Canada. Moreover, in seek-
ing to introduce an unknown product in the Canadian marketplace, the issuers need-
ed to find a way to assess consumer opinions and generate increased acceptability of
their product. The voluntary Debit Code was seen by the industry as a means of achiev-
ing both of these things. To quote from an Industry Canada publication:
... strategic alliances with consumer groups would ... validate the activities of a com-
pany or industry in a way which may forestall more direct government intervention
which would be more costly for the company, industry and perhaps ultimately consumers
and the total economy... [Al strategic alliance with a consumer group would provide
an industry or business with access to the group's networks and partnerships already in
place.... Access to these networks and partnerships would be an additional source of
market intelligence and would further contribute to the ability of the company or indus-
try to favorably influence public opinion and government policy formulation. 199
As we can see, Industry Canada itself is well aware of the phenomenon described
throughout this paper. As this section has demonstrated, one of the reasons why we
notice differences between the US and Canada is a result of the ability of each respec-
tive interest group to overcome the free-rider problem. In Canada, industry interest
groups are able to offer tangible benefits to a small group of entities while consumer
groups are unable to garner the type of support that their American counterparts do.
The problem is compounded through decreased public financial support for the activi-
ties of these groups and by competition from abroad for individual contributions.
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B. Conclusion
It is hoped that the previous discussion has underscored the need to take a
comprehensive view in assessing the substantive ramifications and effectiveness of
existing institutions and in identifying shortcomings in proposals for reform. Public
choice scholarship is a vital tool in this regard, as it can assist academics and legisla-
tors alike in institutional design. Much has been made of the fact that public choice
scholarship has tended to dismantle as opposed to build. Despite this fact, a public
choice/interest group perspective can highlight the fact that interests and institutions
both shape, and are shaped, by each other. We must recognize that while institutions
may have their shortcomings, by the same token, the recognition of the shortcomings
in the process that led to their creation may lead to constructive proposals for
reform. One such strand has been articulated by David Skeel Jr., which he calls
"Institution Reinforcing" public choice. 200 Professor Skeel argues that by changing the
descriptive nature of public choice from one that is singularly focused on one insti-
tution, to one with a comparative dimension, changes can occur in the prescriptive
area as well. 20 1 Such a change can allow one to seek change, not only by describing a
particular institution and its shortcomings, but also by making institutionally affirm-
ing proposals for reform.
To be sure, unlike its US counterpart, the Debit Code leaves much to be desired
from a consumer's point of view. The fact that the consequences of an unauthorized
transaction are not precisely quantified arguably shifts a greater proportion of respon-
sibility for losses on the backs of consumers. The high threshold of $ 3 000 listed in
the hypothetical example fails to induce consumers to take greater care. The dispute
resolution procedures outlined in the Debit Code may be confusing to some and inef-
fective for others, as there are no discernible consequences for financial institutions
that fail to follow them. Barriers are higher still for those not satisfied with the out-
comes of these processes.
The analysis contained in this paper has endeavoured to show that a compara-
tive dimension to institutional design can be very helpful in the law reform process.
Canada can learn much from the experiences of other jurisdictions in the world in
strengthening its institutions. 2 2 What is clear here is that changes must take place if
we are to have a more just and equitable outcome for consumers. To this end, it is
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202. For a comparative analysis of the Canadian Debit Code in relation to codes and legislation adopted in other
jurisdictions, see Benjamin Geva, "Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers" (2003)
38 Can. Bus. L.J. 207.
LOOKING FOR COVER: A PUBLIC CHOICE 141
CRITIQUE OF THE CANADIAN DEBIT CARD CODE
proposed that the concept of a voluntary Debit Code be abandoned in favour of com-
prehensive federal legislation that:
- contains a lower cap on liability for unauthorized transactions. A $100
deductible in the initial loss period with escalating liability ought to encourage a con-
sumer to take just as much care as a flat $ 3 000 deductible would. This would not
result in a personal crisis for consumers yet still act as an incentive for them to take
care. This would also serve as an incentive to industry to improve their systems to
minimize losses for consumers.
I outlines comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms that contain strict
provisions for consumers not to be deprived of their funds after a ten-day period.
Consumers should be provided with written reasons and supplied with any evidence
used in the event of an adverse decision. Severe penalties should be enacted for those
institutions that act in bad faith or do not comply.
• gives the FCAC a more proactive mandate to ensure that institutions com-
ply with their responsibilities. The FCAC should become an agency that acts as an
advocate for consumers and removes the burden of bringing forth lawsuits from con-
sumers in order to ensure that industry complies with its obligations vis-a-vis con-
sumers. This will result in a greater enforcement of consumer rights than is presently
the case and will serve as an incentive for industry compliance by increasing the like-
lihood of litigation in the event of non-compliance with regulations.
- provides for a check-off scheme similar to that used in California, so as to
better fund Canadian consumer interest groups and make sure that the democratic
process is a more balanced one. This would allow Canadian consumer groups to have
better access to revenue streams, which would allow them to assemble better
resources with which they could advocate for the public interest. This would help
them overcome the free-rider problem.
One would hope that these suggestions might go a long way toward ensuring
that the needs of consumers are met in a just, fair and equitable manner. A more
favourable perception of the system may help new products attain a critical mass.
Increased acceptability will lead to greater efficiency and stability that will bring ben-
efits to all parties involved.
In this manner, public choice need not induce an unhealthy scepticism about
the legitimacy of the political process or discourage those who wish to promote
change. While human nature may have its shortcomings, it also has its virtues. Some
institutions have been more effective than others have in achieving their objectives.
Public choice can play a valuable role on a comparative level by making us cognizant
of the fact that certain individuals may wish to use institutions for their own ends, and
this ought to be stressed, by allowing us to draw lessons from previous experiences
in institutional design. The Debit Code is one such example where a public choice
analysis can illustrate how existing structures have emerged and what effect they have
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had on society. However, without the comparative dimension, the analysis lacks in
providing a workable alternative to the existing institutional deficiency. While the
Debit Code may be lacking in certain respects for consumers, there does exist the
potential that in the future, consumers will have more rights than they have today.
However, in order to do so, people must believe that they can still make a difference.
Historical and comparative examples demonstrate that the public choice problem is
not one that is insurmountable. The free-rider issue needs to be addressed and insti-
tutions designed with a view to promoting citizen empowerment so that we may all
live in a more equal, democratic, balanced and free society.


